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‘Necessity knows no law’: The resurrection of Kriegsraison through the 
U.S. targeted killing programme 
Abstract 
The doctrine of Kriegsraison, and its argument that ‘necessity knows no law’, is generally 
considered to have been laid to rest with the creation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
However, this article asserts that Kriegsraison is resurrected and wholly alive in the United 
States’ targeted killing programme. The targeted killing programme, now in existence for more 
than 15 years, remains one of the most problematic aspects of U.S. anti-terror policy and 
continues to raise numerous legal questions. The article argues that treatment of the various 
legal frameworks relevant to targeted killing by the U.S. is suffused with Kriegsraison to such 
an extent that necessity, in its varying iterations, has become the primary guiding principle for 
U.S. uses of force, and assessments as to their legality. This argument is predicated on an 
examination of the United States’ expansive interpretation of jus ad bellum principles, its a-la-
carte approach in recognising the applicability of jus in bello rules, and the designation of 
regions in which it uses force as lying ‘outside the area of active hostilities’. Throughout this 
assessment, parallels are drawn between the conduct of the United States today and between 
that of WWI-era Germany, which was characterised by Kriegsraison’s pervasive influence. 
Finally, the article contends that the use of armed drones as the primary tool for carrying out 
the targeted killing programme must be scrutinised, as this is vital to understanding the 
practical implementation of the Kriegsraison doctrine.   
 
 
Introduction 
‘If the necessity of individuals is recognised as exempting them from punishment for things 
never so injurious done by them from that necessity, this must be still more the case in war, 
since so much more is at stake.’1 
 
                                                      
*PhD candidate, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University. The author wishes to dedicate this 
article to the memory of Grace McDermott (14/11/1990 - 01/05/2017), beloved friend and PhD colleague, whose 
encouragement and support were vital during its writing. She is, and will forever be, deeply missed. Many thanks 
also to my supervisor, Dr. James Gallen, for his invaluable comments and advice. 
1 Carl Lueder (1885), quoted in Lassa Openheim (ed) The Collected Papers of John Westlake on Public 
International Law (Cambridge University Press 1914), 244. 
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The U.S. targeted killing programme has now been in existence for more than fifteen years, 
leading to the deaths of thousands of suspected militants and a much-disputed number of 
civilians.2 Much of the commentary on the programme tends to focus on the legality of targeted 
killing under either of the applicable frameworks of international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law, and on whether or not the U.S. can be said to be involved in a 
global non-international armed conflict with Al Qa’eda and associated forces. However, the 
issue as to whether there is an underlying doctrine of international law guiding U.S. policy in 
this arena has not been examined. This article aims to address this gap. The author contends 
that the targeted killing programme and legal positions of the United States relevant to the 
programme are indicative of the long held to be defunct, and oft-derided, doctrine of 
Kriegsraison.3 The United States professes to act in accordance with international humanitarian 
law (which it claims is the only relevant body of law) in each of its targeting decisions, yet 
many of these decisions leave much to be desired in terms of legality when rigorously assessed 
under this lens. Though the United States is not explicitly relying on Kriegsraison in its 
treatment of the international law relevant to targeted killing, its consistent appeals to 
‘necessity’ in its legal reasoning bestows a privileged position upon this principle of IHL. As 
is shown throughout this article, the cumulative effect of this treatment of necessity, 
demonstrated by the United States in its myriad legal and policy positions on targeting, and the 
language used to justify these positions, amounts to a revival of Kriegsraison.  
 
In the course of the U.S. conflict with Al Qa’eda and associated forces, Kriegsraison has been 
invoked on a few occasions with reference to the Bush administration’s use of enhanced 
interrogation methods.4 However, this article argues that it is the targeted killing programme 
which best reflects the insidious, and indeed invidious, nature of Kriegsraison and identifies 
three key areas in which Kriegsraison has manifested itself: at the jus ad bellum level, in U.S. 
attempts to expand the right of self-defence; at the jus in bello level, in the legal framework 
applied to the targeting of individuals in regions ‘outside the areas of active hostilities’; and, 
                                                      
2 Spencer Ackerman, ‘Obama claims US drone strikes have killed up to 116 civilians’ (The Guardian, 01 July 
2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jul/01/obama-drones-strikes-civilian-deaths> accessed 14 
April 2017. 
3 Neta C. Crawford, Accountability for Killing: Moral Responsbility for Collateral Damage in America’s Post-
9/11 Wars (Oxford University Press, 2013) 177. 
4 See, for example, G D Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War (2nd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2016) 616; B R Farley, ‘Enhanced interrogation, the Report on Rendition, 
Detention and Interrogation, and the Return of Kriegsraison’ (2015) 30 EILR ; S Horton, ‘Kriegsraison or 
Military Necessity? The Bush Administration’s Wilhelmine Attitude Towards the Conduct of War’ (2006) FILJ 
576. 
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finally, in the targeted killing programme’s use of armed drones. In contrast to much of the 
legal literature on targeted killing, this paper contends that the choice of weapon for this 
programme is of some importance, as drones allow for the practical realisation of the 
Kriegsraison doctrine to an extent not previously possible. 
 
A general trend of necessity as defence is coming to the forefront of public international law, 
write Ohlin and May, ‘suggesting that more and more states will argue necessity in the future 
to escape responsibility from their actions’.5 This trend is particularly visible in the United 
States, specifically in the targeted killing programme, which, though never specifically 
referencing Kriegsraison, is suffused with the language of necessity to such an extent that when 
Solis asks ‘is Kriegsraison resurrected in America?’, his question can be answered in the 
affirmative.6 Not only is the targeted killing programme a prime example of Kriegsraison, but 
striking parallels can be drawn between the conduct of Germany in WWI, which was 
characterised by Kriegsraison, and the conduct of the United States today. As Hull has shown, 
WWI-era Germany was highly cognizant of the importance of international law, much as the 
United States is today.7 While much of Germany’s conduct was unlawful, it was nevertheless 
couched in legal language. Germany advocated a theory of law creation that made opinio juris 
a function of state wartime practice, reminiscent of the United States’ attempts to have a right 
of preventive self-defence, and of targeting outside armed conflict scenarios, recognized by the 
international community.8 Meanwhile, the United States conflict with Al Qa’eda and 
associated forces has been accompanied by an expansion in the state’s conception of the ‘self’, 
and a proclivity to use force in anticipation of threats which have not yet crystallized,9 in a 
manner comparable to Germany’s proclaimed right to use preventive force in self-defence 
against an exceedingly broad number of threats to that ‘self.10 Germany also took advantage of 
gaps in the law to use new weapons in unforeseen ways, much as the U.S. has done with armed 
drones.11   
 
                                                      
5 Jens David Ohlin and Larry May, Necessity in International Law (Oxford University Press 2016), 39. 
6 Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press 2016), 616. 
7 See Isabel V. Hull, A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law during the Great War (Cornell 
University Press, 2016). 
8 Ibid 64. 
9 See Ian Hurd, ‘The Permissive Power of the Ban on War’, (2017) 2(1) EJIS 1. 
10 Hull (n7) 46. 
11 Ibid 267. 
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The article proceeds as follows: first, it presents a brief account of the Kriegsraison doctrine. 
This is followed by an analysis of the United States’ elevation of jus ad bellum necessity and 
its expansion of the concept of “imminence”, and the resulting attempts to introduce a right of 
preventive self-defence to international law. Next, U.S. attempts to establish a right to target 
individuals under the IHL framework in regions ‘outside areas of active hostilities’ are 
discussed, before an examination on the use of drones. Finally, the article concludes by 
establishing that the United States is wilfully engaging in an à-la-carte application of 
international law to the targeted killing programme, and that this legal manipulation is a key 
indicator of the resurrection of Kriegsraison.  
 
The doctrine of Kriegsraison  
Kriegsraison is a 19th Century German doctrine which holds that in war, necessity knows no 
law.12 It operates both at the political level of the state and at the military (or operational) level, 
joining the old doctrine of self-preservation with the unconstrained application of military 
necessity. At the political level, Kriegsraison advocates for the strident invocation of the self-
preservation doctrine, providing a State with the excuse for recourse to force for any reason it 
sees fit. At the operational level, Kriegsraison allows for the untrammelled application of the 
principle of military necessity; any action can be justified once it can be said to be militarily 
necessary.  
 
Developed during the Bismarckian and Wilhelminian eras, Kriegsraison maintains that 
belligerents may do whatever they feel is necessary to prevail in an armed conflict, as military 
necessity overrules all law. The doctrine was often expressed as ‘kriegsraison geht vor 
kriegsmanier’: ‘the necessities of war take precedence over the rules of war.’13 Kriegsraison is 
considered as ‘the affirmation of raison d’État in the context of armed conflict’, and is rooted 
in a natural law approach to necessity.14 The doctrine was advocated by numerous German 
commentators who maintained that ‘the laws of war lose their binding force in the case of 
extreme necessity’15, perpetuating the views of ‘the law of war’s fiercest nineteenth-century 
                                                      
12 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmerman (eds) Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 
8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12th August 1949 (International Committee of the Red Cross 1987) 
para. 1386. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ariel Colonomos, The Gamble of War: Is It Possible to Justify Preventive War? (Chris Turner tr, Palgrave 
Macmillan 2013) 83. 
15 Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History (Cambridge University Press 2005), 64. 
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critic’, Carl Von Clausewitz.16 Clausewitz dismissively wrote that international law was 
‘almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning’, and while it accompanied war, it did so 
‘without essentially impairing its power.’17 This Clausewitzian approach is obvious in the 
Kriegsraison doctrine, which was exposited principally by Professor Carl Lueder, who set out 
the terms under which Kriegsraison was applicable. The first was in the case of extreme 
necessity, and the second, in retaliation ‘in case of unlawful non-observance of kriegsmanier 
by the enemy.’ Any departure from Kriegsmanier was justified, explained Lueder, ‘when 
circumstances are such that the accomplishment of the war-aim, or the escape from extreme 
danger, is hindered by sticking to it.’18 
 
During both World Wars, Germany invoked the doctrine in defence of a range of unlawful 
actions.19 Germany’s political and military conduct during World War I in particular was 
characterised by Kriegsraison, as is evidenced by its consistent references to necessity.20 On 
the invasion of Belgium by the Germany Army in 1914, for example, Chancellor von 
Bethmann Hollweg stated in the Reichstag: ‘Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, 
and necessity knows no law.21 World War II was to prove a turning point for the doctrine. 
Kriegsraison was referenced numerous times in the U.S. Military Tribunals at Nuremberg, 
notably in U.S. v List (the Hostage case)22 and in U.S. v Von Leeb et al (the High Command 
case).23 
 
                                                      
16 John Fabien Witt, Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History (Simon & Schuster 2012) 184. 
17 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (first published 1832, Wordsworth Editions Limited 2013) 35-36. Recent 
comments from commentators advising that President Trump ‘get himself some Clausewitz’ might want to also 
consider these other, less savoury, aspects of On War. Max Fisher and Amanda Taub, ‘The Interpreter’ (The 
New York Times, 08 March 2017) <https://www.inboxdb.com/the-interpreter-the-one-sentence-theory-about-
war-that-trump-needs-to-read-645001/> accessed 14 April 2017. 
18 Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare: The Modern History of the International Law of Armed Conflict (2nd 
edn Cambridge University Press 1983) 173. 
19 See, for example, G D Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War, (1st edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2010) 267; World Health Organisation, ‘Public health response to biological and 
chemical weapon: WHO guidance. Draft 2003’ (2nd edn, World Health Organisation 2003); Judgment of the 
United States Military Tribunal (1948) 8 LRTWC 34.  
20 Hull (2016) 44.  
21 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: a moral argument with historical illustrations (4th edn, Basic Books 
2006) 240. Walzer further writes that ‘here, as in military history generally’, the plea of military necessity 
‘means a great deal less than it appears to do’. 
22 Judgment of the United States Military Tribunal (1948) 8 LRTWC 34. The List case, commonly known as the 
Hostage case, tried twelve defendants on four counts of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity 
through being principals in, and accessories to, the murder of thousands of persons from the civilian population 
of Greece, Yugoslavia, Norway, and Albania between September 1939 and May 1945.  
23 Judgment of the United States Military Tribunal (1949) 11 LRTWC 1 
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Regarding Germany’s justification of unlawful acts as acts of military necessity, the judgment 
in List (commonly known as the Hostage case) stated: 
It is apparent from the evidence of these defendants that they considered military 
necessity, a matter to be determined by them, a complete justification of their acts. We 
do not concur in the view that the rules of warfare are anything less than they purport 
to be. Military necessity or expediency do not justify a violation of positive rules. 24 
 
And later: 
Here again the German theory of expediency and military necessity (Kriegsraeson geht 
vor kriegsmanier) superseded established rules of international law. As we have 
previously stated in this opinion, the rules of International Law must be followed even 
if it results in the loss of a battle or even a war. Expediency or necessity cannot warrant 
their violation.25 
 
The High Command case (U.S. v Von Leeb et al), was the final of the twelve Nuremberg trials. 
Under count one of the indictment – ‘aggressive war’ – the tribunal held that: 
‘the doctrine of military necessity has been widely urged. In the various treatises of 
International Law there has been much discussion on this question. It has been the 
viewpoint of many German writers and to a certain extent has been contended in this 
case that military necessity includes the right to do anything that contributes to the 
winning of a war… We content ourselves on this subject with stating that such a view 
would eliminate humanity and decency and all law from the conduct of war and it is a 
contention which this Tribunal repudiates as contrary to the accepted usages of civilized 
nations.26  
 
Regarding the defendants’ plea of military necessity, the Tribunal found: 
This theory (of military necessity as an excuse for justification of scorched earth policy 
during retreat) is nothing more than the reapplication of the well-known German 
principle ‘Kriegsraison geht vor kriegsmanier’ which has been advanced by various 
German writers and faithfully transmitted into action by the German Armies during the 
last two world wars. According to this theory, the laws of war lose their binding force 
                                                      
24 USMT (n22) 
25 Ibid  
26 USMT (n23) 
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in case of extreme necessity which was said to arise when the violation of the laws of 
war offers other means of escape from extreme danger, or the realization of the purpose 
of war – namely, the overpowering of the enemy. Such a theory is merely a denial of 
all laws, and a reaffirmation of the philosophy that the end justifies the means. 27 
 
These judgments, along with the 1949 Geneva Conventions, were said to have ‘put the last 
nails in the coffin of the doctrine of Kriegsraison.’28 The 1987 Commentary to Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions makes specific reference to Kriegsraison in its discussion 
of Article 35: 
…Law is a restraint which cannot be confused with more usages to be applied when 
convenient. The doctrine of "Kriegsraison" was still applied during the Second World 
War. It is possibly the uncertainty as to the applicability of the Hague law in conditions 
which had changed considerably since 1907 that contributed to this to some extent. 
However, it is probable that the resort to this doctrine was above all based on contempt 
for the law, the weakening of which may be characteristic and a danger of our age. 
"Kriegsraison" was condemned at Nuremberg, and this condemnation has been 
confirmed by legal writings. One can and should consider this theory discredited. It is 
totally incompatible with the wording of Article 35, paragraph 1, and with the very 
existence of the Protocol.29  
 
Kriegsraison is thus considered a defunct legal doctrine and has not been invoked in name by 
any state since World War II. Essentially, Kriegsraison was the unlimited application of 
military necessity, granting belligerents ‘the right to do whatever is required to prevail in armed 
conflict; to do whatever they believe is required to win.’30 Importantly, the belligerent was also 
the sole judge of this necessity, meaning that the belligerent can ‘violate the law or repudiate 
it or ignore it whenever that is deemed to be for its military advantage.’31  
 
However, Kriegsraison also operates at the political level. There has never been a clear-cut 
distinction in Kriegsraison between the principle of military necessity found in international 
                                                      
27 USMT (n23). 
28 Scott Horton, ‘Kriegsraison or Military Necessity? The Bush Administration’s Wilhelmine Attitude Towards 
the Conduct of War (2006) 30 Fordham ILJ 576, 589. 
29 Sandoz, Swinarsky and Zimmerman (n12) para.1386 
30 Solis (n6) 285. 
31 Ibid 286. 
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humanitarian law and the principle of necessity found in the international law of self-defence. 
As Colonomos writes, ‘Kriegsraison made no distinction between the violation of the law of 
war and transgressions of law in war, and did not indeed concern itself with it very much.’32 
Kriegsraison is primarily concerned with the supremacy of necessity at all levels of war-
making. It is a doctrine of both political and military expedience, as was recognised at the 
tribunals in Nuremberg, as well as ‘a way of speaking in code, or a hyperbolical way of 
speaking, about probability and risk.’33 Nor does Kriegsraison justify only whatever is 
necessary to win a war; it also justifies ‘whatever is necessary to reduce the risks of losing, or 
simply to reduce losses or the likelihood of losses in the course of war.’34 Furthermore, it 
emphasises the exceptional character of conflicts or situations in order to breach, or to bend, 
the law.  
 
Kriegsraison and the jus ad bellum: self-preservation and the expansion of self-defence 
At the state level, Kriegsraison has long manifested itself as the doctrine of self-preservation.35 
Self-preservation serves as the political arm of the Kriegsraison doctrine. The old doctrine of 
self-preservation allowed for recourse to force for any reason related to the preservation of the 
security of the State. It can, then, be considered a specific application of the broader concept 
of necessity – with anything necessary for the State’s security warranting the use of force. Self-
preservation was considered a ‘natural’ or ‘inherent’ right, related to the ‘right to security’ in 
Vattel.36 In his Collected Papers, Westlake describes the doctrine as such: 
...when a state employs force in the territory of another state...or when it attempts by 
threats to restrain the freedom or action of another state within the territory of the latter, 
or that of the subjects of another state elsewhere than within its own territory… - the 
state so acting or threatening must find its justification in some other principle (other 
than its own sovereignty). The principle commonly put forward on such occasion is 
that of self-preservation, which writers on international law often class among their 
fundamental, primitive, primary or absolute rights.37 
                                                      
32 Colonomos (n14) 85. 
33 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (4th edn, Perseus 
Books 2006) 144. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Jasmine Moussa, ‘Can jus ad bellum override jus in bello? Reaffirming the separation of the two bodies of 
law’ (2008) 90 (872) International Review of the Red Cross 980. 
36 Stanimir A. Alexandrov, Self-defense against the use of force in international law (Kluwer Law International 
1996) 23. 
37 John Westlake, The Collected Papers of John Westlake on Public International Law (Lassa Openheim ed, 1st 
edn, Cambridge University Press 1914) 121. 
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For many years, self-defence was held to be synonymous with self-preservation, or as a specific 
instance of it.38 Alexandrov notes that during the 19th and early 20th centuries, self-preservation, 
self-defence, necessity and necessity of self-defence were used as ‘more or less interchangeable 
terms.’39 However, the two concepts are considerably different. Self-preservation represents a 
particularly broad reading of the right of self-defence, in which a State’s fundamental right to 
self-preservation supersedes their international obligations and the rights of any other State.40  
If the argument for a right of self-preservation is followed to its conclusion, any conduct 
deemed necessary by a State to ensure the preservation of its existence is ‘bound to be 
considered juridically legitimate’, even if ‘undeniably contrary to an international obligation 
of that State.’41 Self-preservation can thus ‘cloak with an appearance of legality almost any 
unwarranted act of violence on the part of a state.’42  
 
In the 1837 Caroline incident, the British Ambassador to Washington justified British action 
by invoking ‘the necessity of self-defence and self-preservation’ when destroying the 
‘piratical’ steamboat Caroline.43 The Caroline incident is widely regarded as being the incident 
that changed self-defence from being ‘a political excuse to a legal doctrine’, 44 with the U.S. 
Secretary of State’s formulation of the conditions of self-defence requiring the British 
Government to show: 
(i) The existence of “…necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving 
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation…” 
(ii) “that the local authorities…did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act 
justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and 
kept clearly within it”.45 
 
                                                      
38 Alexandrov (n36) 23. 
39 Alexandrov (n36) 23. 
40 The issue of self-preservation has surfaced more recently, in the advisory opinion of the International Court of 
Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, in which the Court allowed for the possibility of 
nuclear weapons use in cases where, ‘in an extreme circumstance of self-defence’, the survival of a state could be 
said to be at stake. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 
226, 96 
41 Addendum to the eight report on state responsibility by M. Robert Ago, Special Rapporteur 
(A/CN.4/318/Add.5-7), the internationally wrongful act of the State, source of international responsibility (part 
1) 16. 
42 R.Y. Jennings, ‘The Caroline and McLeod Cases’, (1938) 32 Am J Int’l L 82, 91. 
43 Ibid 82. 
44 Ibid 
45 Ibid 89. 
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Yet Jennings writes that ‘in arguing the Caroline case, the fundamental distinction between 
self-defence and self-preservation was not always appreciated’,46 as can be seen through 
examples of earlier state practice against perceived or claimed threats and justified by self-
defence.47 Alexandrov references the United Kingdom’s shelling of Copenhagen and seizing 
of the Danish fleet after the Peace of Tilsit of 1807. This occurred following Denmark’s refusal 
to deliver its fleet up to the custody of the U.K. after the British Government demanded they 
do so, being cognisant of a secret clause of the treaty under which Denmark should, in certain 
circumstances, declare a war against the U.K. Though this was a case of the use of force for 
self-preservation, the U.K. justified the shelling and seizure of the fleet as a case of necessity 
in self-defence, stating that “when a state is unable of itself to prevent a hostile use being made 
of its territory or resources, it ought to allow proper measures” by the threatened State.48 The 
Virginius incident in 1873, in which a vessel under the U.S flag was seized by Spain on the 
high seas in 1873 while attempting to smuggle reinforcements to insurgents, provides another 
example of justification under self-defence. A number of U.S. and British nationals, who had 
been both crew members and passengers on the ship, were shot without trial. The U.K. did not 
protest against the seizure of British subjects on the high seas, but only about their executions, 
admitting that the latter was an act “under the expectation of instant damage in self-defence”.49 
The Caroline incident, however, used the terms self-defence and self-preservation 
interchangeably. Despite this, in its attempts to define the limits of self-defence and to examine 
its legal content, self-defence was said to have been “rescued from the Naturalist notions of an 
absolute primordial right of self-preservation”.50  
 
Has self-defence really been ‘rescued’ from self-preservation? It would appear that the answer 
is no. Indeed, it can be argued that in a perverse manner, the UN Charter itself has been 
instrumental in the revival of self-preservation and Kriegsraison. In creating the UN Charter, 
those states involved aimed to make unilateral and aggressive uses of force unacceptable. 
However, it was recognised that states’ had an inherent right of self-defence. Article 51 of the 
Charter codified this self-defence exception. While the events of 1930s and 1940s had 
apparently led the international law community to recognise ‘the absurdity of having a 
prohibition on aggression or first use of force but permitting a state to judge for itself whether 
                                                      
46 Ibid 91. 
47 Alexandrov (n36) 20. 
48 Ibid 20. 
49 Ibid 21. 
50 Jennings (n42) 92. 
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its use of force was in self-defence’, the United States was concerned that the Charter – and 
the veto power of other future members of the Security Council – might impede its ability to 
use force in pursuit of its interests.51 At the behest of the U.S., Article 51, permitting the use of 
force in self-defence, was added to the Charter. This exception was not present in the 
Dumbarton Oaks draft of the Charter.52 Scott explains that the combination of the Article 51 
exception on self-defence, along with the makeup and voting system of the Security Council, 
has meant that the U.S. has retained the capacity to block any decision disputing that its uses 
of force were not taken in self-defence.53  
 
Similarly, while the creation of the UN Charter and the Geneva Conventions were supposed to 
have nailed the coffin of Kriegsraison shut, the doctrine is far from gone and buried.54 The 
spectre of Kriegsraison continues to haunt the modern international law regime. As Hurd has 
shown, the codification of the self-defence exception in Article 51 of the Charter has resulted 
in a redefining of what States consider relevant to their security interests, and an expansion of 
the ‘self’ in self-defence. Self-defence has become ‘the most popular justification for war, often 
with all sides in the conflict claiming it as their motivation.’55 Colonomos notes that 
international law never disavowed the just war writings; rather, it sought merely ‘to temper 
Kriegsraison and to restrain the Bismarckian sneer’.56 Instead, Hurd argues, the international 
legalisation of the self-defence exception has ‘rewritten “just war theory” as “legal war 
theory”.’57 Recalling that, in an operational setting, Kriegsraison represents the ‘affirmation of 
raisons-d’états’,58 Article 51 constitutes the legalisation of raisons-d’états, providing it with ‘a 
novel institutional home’.59 This leads Hurd to comment that Machiavelli’s adage that ‘that 
war is just which is necessary’ would today be better phrased as ‘that war is legal which is 
necessary.’60 Of course, as has previously been mentioned, Kriegsraison makes the belligerent 
the sole judge of that necessity, and thus the sole judge as to whether or not its actions are legal. 
                                                      
51 Shirley V. Scott, International Law, US Power: The United States’ Quest for Legal Security (Cambridge 
University Press 2012) 122. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid 123. 
54 Horton (n28) 589. 
55 Hurd (n9) 11. 
56 Colonomos (n14) 84. 
57 Hurd (n9) 17. 
58 Colonomos (n14) 83. 
59 Hurd (n9) 17. 
60 Ibid. 
 12 
This has important consequences for the United States, which remains the sole judge of those 
actions which it takes in preventive self-defence. 
 
The expansion of ‘imminence’ and the expansion of the ‘self’ 
Since the publication of the 2002 National Security Strategy by the first administration of 
President George W. Bush, subsequently known as ‘the Bush doctrine’, the United States has 
made concerted efforts to create a right of preventive self-defence in international law.61 Much 
of this effort has centred around placing a greater emphasis on the importance of the principle 
of necessity through the broadening of the “imminence” requirement, which the U.S. argues is 
necessary to respond to the threat it faces from non-state armed groups and the exceptional 
challenges these groups present.62 This purported right of preventive self-defence is 
exceedingly reminiscent of the elevation of necessity and the doctrine of Kriegsraison in WWI-
Germany.  
 
Hull observes that WWI-era Germany had developed a ‘uniquely robust doctrine of military 
necessity thought to apply to many levels of action from the tactical (combat), to operational 
(battle), and at the level of the state itself (war and peace).63 A convergence of circumstances 
and policy-making led to the proliferation of dangers which, in the minds’ of Germany’s 
military and civilian leaders,  
‘…easily fulfilled for them the stringent conditions of military necessity enumerated 
since Grotius. Danger became anticipatory, and vital interest was no longer confined to 
self-preservation, but expanded to include victory, or even mere military 
convenience.’64  
 
This focus on the use of force to arrest conjectural threats against an expanded ‘self’ for the 
sake of victory, or even convenience, is symptomatic of Kriegsraison. Throughout the course 
of WWI, Germany invoked a defence of Notwehr and Notstand. Chancellor Theobald von 
Bethmann Hollweg invoked Notwehr as legal justification for Germany’s violation of Belgian 
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neutrality at the beginning of World War I; Notwehr translating as ‘necessary defence’.65 
Thereafter the concept of Notstand was cited as Germany’s official defence. Notstand was a 
condition of necessity which pardons a person from ‘having harmed the rights of third parties 
in the course of defending himself; it does not require a preceding injustice.’66 As Hull notes, 
Notstand was never a concept in international law and closely resembled the doctrine of self-
preservation.67 Notstand required only that there be ‘existential danger’, ‘no other possible 
means of averting the danger’, and ‘no responsibility for creating the emergency situation on 
the part of the state claiming it’.68 This particular construction of ‘existential danger’ came with 
an elastic interpretation, including not only threats to the existence of a state, but also to its 
current territory or population, or its state power.69 Unlike the customary law of self-defence 
at the time, Notstand omitted the requirement that ‘the danger be immediate and real (not the 
result of assumption or imagination), the response proportionate, and compensation 
mandatory.’70 
 
Today, Hurd argues, we see a similar expansion in understandings of what constitutes the ‘self’ 
which states claim a right to defend: ‘the self in “self-defence” has grown beyond the territorial 
borders of the state and now encompasses a range of state interests abroad.’71 As such, the 
‘self’ that states now invoke and defend is conceptual rather than territorial.72 This expansion 
tracks the expansion of the ‘self’ visible in Germany during WWI. Similarities are also to be 
found in Germany’s Notwehr and U.S. constructions of ‘imminence’, as is discussed below. 
These expansive constructions of the ‘self’ and of ‘imminence’ are key elements in U.S. 
arguments for, and justifications of, its current military conduct. 
 
The United States refers to a number of factors in how it determines the ‘imminence’ of an 
attack in the 2013 Presidential Policy Guidance, including: 
‘the nature and immediacy of the threat; the probability of an attack; whether the 
anticipated attack is part of a concerted pattern of continuing armed activity; the likely 
scale of the attack and the injury, loss, or damage likely to result therefrom in the 
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absence of mitigating action; and the likelihood that there will be other opportunities to 
undertake effective in self-defense that may be expected to cause less serious collateral 
injury, loss or damage.’73 
 
The U.S. has further stated that it is ‘increasingly recognized by the international community’ 
that the traditional conception of what constitutes an “imminent attack” must be understood ‘in 
light of the modern-day capabilities, techniques, and technological innovations of terrorist 
organizations.’74 Yet, to date, only the United Kingdom has expressed an understanding of 
imminence in a manner akin to the United States.75 Hakimi notes that, according to the above 
criteria, “imminence” does not have its ordinary meaning, permitting defensive forces against 
conjectural attacks.76 
 
A right of preventive self-defence? 
 
As Piggott notes, the 2002 National Security Strategy self-consciously set out to change the 
“imminence test” from one of an ‘instant, overwhelming’ danger to a ‘grave and gathering’ 
danger. The difference is profound.77 The Bush doctrine ‘sought not so much to “adapt” the 
concept of imminent attack to the change circumstances of a post-9/11 world as to replace it 
altogether’.78 As such, it represented a ‘genuine innovation’, completely abandoning the 
traditional condition of imminence.79 Attempts by the U.S. to transform the concept of 
imminence continues today. Imminence acquires a unique flexibility for proponents of a right 
to preventive self-defence, particularly with the introduction of the concept of a ‘continuing 
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imminent threat’.80 The elasticity bestowed on “imminence” by the U.S has been variously 
described as ‘[used] in a way that deprives the word of its ordinary meaning’, ‘woefully 
overbroad’ and as ‘expanding the concept…beyond recognition’.81   
 
Yet rather than the U.S. merely offering a new or revised definition of “imminence”, Ohlin and 
May argue that the U.S. has created a new concept in international law which connects 
necessity to self-defence in a manner akin to that found in domestic legal systems.82 Ohlin and 
May specifically reference Germany’s penal code, which denotes self-defence as Notwehr, and 
the U.S. Model Penal Code, which in §3.04 on self-defence, uses the phrase ‘immediately 
necessary’.83 Of course, this connection between necessity and jus ad bellum self-defence was 
in existence in Germany during WWI, as discussed above. 
 
In effect, the U.S. interpretation of “imminence” establishes a standard of ‘immediate 
necessity’, in which ‘the relevant time period is the one measured by the concept of necessity, 
not that measured by imminence.84 It elevates necessity to a position of privilege over the 
principle of proportionality, in which the perceived necessity of an action taken in self-defence 
outweighs other considerations of its lawfulness, to a degree highly reminiscent of that found 
in Kriegsraison. As Hurd notes, this interpretation of ‘imminence’ effectively ‘substitutes 
“threat” as the trigger for military response where the Charter text says “armed attack”.’85 It 
was noted in the earlier discussion on Kriegsraison that, as a doctrine, it justifies whatever is 
necessary to reduce the risk of losing, or to reduce losses or even the risk of losses in the course 
of war. As such, Kriegsraison is extremely concerned with threats and risk avoidance. It is 
therefore notable that the U.S. has invoked the avoidance of risk in discussions around 
imminence, stating that requiring its forces to wait until the ‘precise time, place and manner of 
an attack became clear’ would create ‘an unacceptably high risk that our efforts would fail, and 
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that Americans would be killed’.86 Essentially, the U.S. construction of imminence reunites the 
principles of imminence and necessity, and re-establishes the connection between self-defence 
and self-preservation.  
 
What legal standing does this alleged right of preventive self-defence have? It is now generally 
accepted by the international legal community that a right of anticipatory (or pre-emptive) self-
defence exists, but the same cannot be said for a right of preventive self-defence.87 Anticipatory 
self-defence occurs when a State uses force against an attack that has yet to physically strike 
its territory, but which is expected imminently. How imminent an attack is, and how the word 
‘imminent’ is defined by the State employing force in self-defence, is central when considering 
whether a case of anticipatory self-defence is justified. The mere threat of an attack is not 
enough to resort to force in self-defence.88 In relation to targeted killing, the 2010 report by 
Philip Alston, the then-UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions, supports the more permissive anticipatory approach to self-defence in the case of 
an imminent attack, stating that the view ‘more accurately reflects State practice and the weight 
of scholarship’.89 Alston notes that this remains subject to the strictures articulated in 
Caroline.90 This position supports the broad consensus on the matter, which is that ‘if a right 
to anticipatory self-defence exists, it is limited’.91 Even with the general consensus that 
anticipatory self-defence is not unlawful, states have been reluctant to rely on anticipatory self-
defence as justification for their actions.92 
 
Preventive self-defence reaches further than anticipatory self-defence in its expansive 
approach. It is defined by Reisman and Armstrong as: 
‘a claim to entitlement to use unilaterally, without prior international authorisation, high 
levels of violence to arrest an incipient development that is not yet operational or 
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directly threatening, but that, if permitted to mature, could be seen by the potential pre-
emptor as susceptible to neutralisation only at a higher and possibly unacceptable cost 
to itself.’93 
 
In other words, it is a ‘military action against a potential adversary in advance of a suspected 
attack’.94 It is distinct from anticipatory self-defence in that those contemplating anticipatory 
self-defence ‘can point to a palpable and imminent threat’.95 In the case of preventive self-
defence, a State believes that a threat exists or that a threat will exist and argues that force can 
be utilised in self-defence against that threat. Any preventive action taken is ‘deliberately 
future-oriented’, and ‘loses its defensive character’.96 Preventive self-defence is not only 
incompatible with accepted interpretations of Article 51 of the UN Charter, it is also not 
supported by state practice.97 Alexandrov states that ‘while there may be some uncertainty as 
to whether use of force against imminent attack may be justified as legitimate self-defence, 
practice has clearly illustrated that there is no right’ of preventive self-defence,98 while Alston 
writes that preventive self-defence is ‘deeply contested and lacks support under international 
law’.99  
 
The scope of a right of preventive self-defence as claimed by the U.S. in the 2002 National 
Security Strategy is unprecedented in the modern international law regime, but it is entirely 
familiar if considering the doctrine of Kriegsraison and Germany’s application of Notwehr and 
Notstand. As Ohlin and May note: 
‘if imminence is an additional constraint on defensive force over and above the 
necessity requirement, then preventive war is illegal, because it would satisfy the 
necessity requirement but not the imminence requirement. The only way to get around 
this conclusion is to subordinate the imminence requirement to the necessity 
requirement and conclude that the former element does not need to be met if the latter 
element is satisfied.’100  
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This, of course, is exactly what Kriegsraison does, subordinating all other considerations to the 
necessity requirement, while leaving the belligerent the sole judge of that necessity.  
 
The lack of support from the international community for defensive action against non-
imminent threats highlights the anachronism of the U.S. position. Ruys notes that even among 
those states supporting a broader interpretation of the right of self-defence, ‘support for self-
defence against non-imminent threats is virtually non-existent’.101 Consider, for example, the 
position of France regarding self-defence against an imminent threat, which is set out in the 
French Armed Forces law of armed conflict manual. The manual states that an ‘imminent 
threat’ refers to a: 
‘…potential aggression, the accomplishment of which is likely but has not yet been 
realised. This notion corresponds to the Anglo-Saxon expression of ‘hostile intention’. 
Such a threat, in French law, does not justify recourse to individual self-defence, except 
if the realisation of the aggression has begun. This situation is generally provided and 
regulated for in the rules of engagement and behaviour based on the circumstances’.102 
 
Germany, too, along with states such as Lichtenstein, Japan, Singapore, Switzerland and 
Uganda, has ‘placed great weight on the imminence requirement’.103 Meanwhile, in response 
to the High-Level Panel’s Report on Threats, Challenges and Change, China stated that: 
‘…In case of self-defence against armed attacks, any use of force must have the 
authorization of the Security Council. Any “imminent threat” should be carefully 
judged and handled by the Security Council.’104 
 
Furthermore, whilst the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
accepts that there exists a right of self-defence where an attack is imminent, it goes on to ask: 
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‘Can a State, without going to the Security Council, claim in these circumstances the 
right to act in anticipatory self-defence, not just pre-emptively (against an imminent or 
proximate threat) but preventively (against a non-imminent or non-proximate one)?105 
 
The High-Level Panel’s conclusion is that it cannot. It states that: 
‘…the answer must be that, in a world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the 
global order and the norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be based is 
simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive action, as distinct from 
collectively endorsed action, to be accepted. Allowing one to so act is to allow all.’106 
 
This purported right of preventive self-defence promoted by the U.S. has been accompanied 
by a dangerous blurring of the boundaries between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello, and 
attempts to apply jus ad bellum standards and IHL to scenarios in which IHRL is applicable. It 
is to these issues that our attention now turns.   
 
Kriegsraison and the jus in bello: targeting in regions ‘outside areas of active hostilities’ 
The subversive impact of Kriegsraison visible in the promotion of a purported right of 
preventive self-defence is also in evidence in the U.S. blurring of the jus ad bellum with the jus 
in bello. The U.S. believes that, since 2001, it has been engaged in global, non-international 
armed conflict (NIAC), with no defined geographical boundaries, against Al Qa’eda and 
associated forces.107 The U.S. argues that this NIAC gives it the right to target members of Al 
Qa’eda and associated forces under the framework of international humanitarian law applicable 
to NIACs. However, the U.S. also argues that its inherent right of self-defence also grants it 
permission to target suspected militants. Speaking to the American Society of International 
Law in 2010, Harold Koh, in his role as then-Legal Advisor at the U.S. Department of State, 
said that ‘a state that is engaged in armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not required 
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to provide targets with legal process before the state may use armed force’.108 In his 2013 
speech at the National Defense University, President Obama again put forward the U.S. 
position that targeted killing takes place within an armed conflict under the U.S.’ inherent right 
of self-defence, stating: 
…America's actions are legal. We were attacked on 9/11. Within a week, Congress 
overwhelmingly authorized the use of force. Under domestic law, and international law, 
the United States is at war with Al Qa’eda, the Taliban, and their associated forces. We 
are at war with an organization that right now would kill as many Americans as they 
could if we did not stop them first. So this is a just war – a war waged proportionally, 
in last resort, and in self-defense.109 
 
The 2013 DOJ White Paper states likewise, arguing that the targeted killing programme is 
lawful under ‘the inherent right to national self-defense recognized in international law.’ It 
further states that the use of force ‘against a senior operational leader of al’Qa’ida or its 
associated forces…’ would be justified as an act of national self-defense, and that additionally, 
the U.S. is engaged in a non-international armed conflict with al-qa’ida and its associated 
forces. Another report, released to the ACLU in 2015 following legal proceedings, holds that:  
As a matter of international law, the United States may use lethal force in 
accordance with the laws of war in order to prosecute its armed conflict with al-
qa’ida and associated forces in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, and 
the United States may also use force consistent with our inherent right of 
national self-defense.110 
 
This is the ‘naked self-defense’ theory proposed by Anderson, who argues that ‘a targeted 
killing within an armed conflict does not have to comply with IHL as long as it qualifies as 
legitimate self-defense’, with Anderson’s rationale being that ‘the proper international legal 
rationale for targeted killing is self-defense, not that the target is a combatant under IHL’.111 
This view is not tenable. As Alston has noted, the law of armed conflict and the rules governing 
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a state’s right to self-defence are two sets of rules that are ‘radically different’.112  In his 2010 
report, Alston writes that while Koh’s statement was ‘an important starting point’, it fails to 
address: 
some of the most central legal issues including: the scope of the armed conflict in which  
the US asserts it is engaged, the criteria for individuals who may be targeted and killed, 
the existence of any substantive or procedural safeguards to ensure the legality and 
accuracy of killings, and the existence of accountability mechanisms.113 
 
The consistent invocation of the right of self-defence by the United States is redolent of 
Kriegsraison, representing as it does a deliberate attempt to confuse the applicable jus in bello 
legal regime with the jus ad bellum. In its repeated assertions that targeted killings are lawful 
under its right of self-defence, without reference to the applicable legal framework which 
would apply in such instances (except to note that targeted strikes conform to the principles of 
necessity and proportionality), the U.S. returns necessity and military necessity to their former 
use as justification for unlawful acts, rather than excuse.114 As Corn writes, ‘the scope of lawful 
authority to employ force during mission execution will be subtly but unquestionably degraded 
if ad bellum principles are utilized as a substitute for in bello regulation.’115 
 
This elevation of necessity, and the obfuscation of the dividing lines between the jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello, is particularly relevant to the U.S. designation of certain regions within which 
it carries out targeted killings as ‘outside areas of active hostilities’. This term is not a legal 
term of art; it is a U.S. creation which is to be found solely in the 2013 Presidential Policy 
Guidance.116 As Brookman-Byrne has noted, this term does not reflect international law 
relevant to uses of force or the conduct of hostilities.117 Furthermore, it is regularly applied to 
regions ‘in which no attempt has been made to demonstrate that armed conflicts are occurring’, 
and in situations that do not reach the required threshold to establish the existence of an armed 
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conflict.118 The application of this term to regions which are not experiencing armed conflict, 
and therefore to which it is likely that IHRL, and not IHL, should apply is one of the most 
telling aspects of the political and military expediency of the targeted killing programme.  
 
The existence of a specific Presidential Policy – the 2013 PPG -  for those targeted killings 
which take place in locales identified as ‘outside areas of active hostilities’ was revealed in 
2013.119 According to a 2016 report, the designation ‘area of active hostilities’ applies not only 
to regions where an armed conflict under international law is taking place, but also takes into 
account ‘the size and scope of the terrorist threat, the scope and intensity of U.S. 
counterterrorism operations, and the necessity of protecting any U.S. forces in the relevant 
location.’120 Under these criteria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, certain areas of Libya and, as of 
March 2017, Somalia, are designated ‘areas of active hostilities’. As such, the 2013 PPG does 
not apply to these regions, but to targeting operations taking place elsewhere. It also does not 
apply to direct action ‘taken when the United States is acting quickly to defend U.S. or partner 
forces from attack or outside the counterterrorism context.’121  The United States maintains 
that the 2013 PPG affords ‘heightened policy standards and procedures’ to regions which are 
outside areas of active hostilities.122 These ‘policy standards’, far from demonstrating a 
commitment to heightened protections for peoples in those areas, merely reflect the legal 
standards which the United States is required to apply to regions designated as ‘outside areas 
of active hostilities’, given that these standards simply reflect the requirements of the 
international human rights law framework which should be applied to these regions.123 It is, 
however, exceedingly unlikely that the U.S. will recognise the human rights standards with 
which it is required to oblige. Although the U.S. recognises that IHRL is not entirely displaced 
by IHL during armed conflict, it continues to contest the extraterritorial application of the 
ICCPR.124  
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Despite this, the U.S. consistently makes reference to legal norms which appear to have been 
imported wholesale from law enforcement standards found in international and domestic 
human rights law, while continuing to maintain that it is involved in a transnational non-
international armed conflict to which international humanitarian law applies as lex specialis. 
Yet given the multiplicity of geographical areas and legal scenarios within which the targeted 
killing programme operates, it is impossible to apply one legal framework to all of the targeted 
killings carried out under the auspices of the ‘war on terror’. Targeted killings must be assessed 
on a case-by-case basis to legally analyse and classify them – there is certainly no ‘one size fits 
all’ approach available.125 This is true even in cases where a State has lawfully resorted to force 
under the law of self-defence. Any targeted killing carried out in self-defence must still abide 
by the relevant regulatory legal framework of international humanitarian law and/or 
international human rights law, dependant on the context in question. 
 
IHRL and the importance of ‘imminence’ 
As with jus ad bellum and resort to force, a central question in international human rights law 
as to the legality or otherwise of an instance of targeted killing rests heavily on ‘imminence’. 
Yet imminence, like necessity and proportionality, has a very different meaning under IHRL 
than those terms in the jus ad bellum and in IHL. The traditional view of imminence in 
international human rights law is that ‘imminence encompasses a person literally in the process 
of using deadly force’, and as such, imminence ‘requires a visible threat to human life.’126 This 
imminence requirement is distinct from the concept of imminence required for the use of force 
by a State in anticipatory self-defence.127 The two concepts should not be conflated. Any 
application of the inter-state use of force definition of imminence, rather than the IHRL concept 
of imminence, to an operation which requires that human rights standards be applied will be 
unlawful. 
 
However, as Heller comments, the traditional view of imminence under human rights law is 
‘probably too strict outside of the domestic law-enforcement context.’ He believes the best 
interpretation to be such that the targets of a strike under an international human rights law 
framework: 
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‘would have to be planning a specific attack, not simply preparing for unspecified 
future attacks. The second requirement, however, would be variable: as long as the 
United States could not feasibly use non-lethal means to neutralize the target, it could 
strike the target at any temporal stage of the intended attack – planning, preparing, or 
execution.’128 
 
This is also the interpretation of imminence proposed by Alston: 
‘the legal framework should take into account the possibility that a threat may be so 
imminent that a warning and the graduated use of force are too risky or futile (e.g. the 
suspect is about to use a weapon or blow himself up). At the same time, it must put in 
place safeguards to ensure that the evidence of imminence is reliable, based on a high 
degree of certainty, and does not circumvent the requirements of necessity and 
proportionality.’129 
 
The U.S. consistently justifies targeted killings by maintaining that every strike is conducted 
against an individual who poses an imminent threat.130 This comes with a number of conditions 
attached: 
‘…the condition that an operational leader present an “imminent” threat of violent 
attack against the United States does not require the United States to have clear 
evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the 
immediate future.’131 
 
As such, a high-level official in a U.S. administration could conclude that: 
‘…an individual poses an “imminent threat” of violent attack against the United States. 
Moreover, where the al-Qa’ida member in question has recently been involved in 
activities posing an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States, and 
there is no evidence suggesting that he has renounced or abandoned such activities, that 
member’s involvement in al-Qa’ida’s continuing terrorist campaign against the United 
States would support the conclusion that the member poses an imminent threat.’132 
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This standard of ‘imminence’ flagrantly flouts the human rights standards around the use of 
lethal force. The U.S. has introduced the law enforcement terminology of imminence (while 
wildly distorting that conception of imminence) into what the U.S. argues is an armed conflict 
scenario -  yet this standard has no pertinence to the jus in bello application of IHL. As such, 
the U.S. stands accused of mangling the law.133 Rather than this ‘mangling’ of law being 
accidental or unintended, it reflects a deliberate attempt at obfuscation and deflection. The U.S. 
has approached the possible relevant regulatory frameworks of the targeted killing programme 
in an á la carte manner – ‘cherry picked from different legal regimes’, by amalgamating aspects 
of both international humanitarian law and international human rights law in their policy 
rhetoric, rather than simply abiding by the relevant rules in each case of targeted killing.134 The 
U.S. has purposely confused the applicable legal frameworks. While it maintains that it respects 
the applicable law, the U.S. has instead decided to acknowledge whichever rules it prefers in 
any given instance, with little evidence that they actually abide by these rules, regarding them 
instead as ‘discretionary rather than binding’.135  
 
Kriegsraison and necessity in IHL and IHRL 
The fact that the U.S. has attempted to conflate human rights norms with the norms of the jus 
ad bellum, and stated that it will not target an individual ‘if it is feasible to capture the target at 
the time of the operation’ demonstrates that it is aware that the wider international community 
believes that it is international human rights law, and not the law of armed conflict, which 
should apply to many of the drone strikes in the targeted killing programme, even as the U.S. 
continues to deny international human rights law’s extraterritorial application. This confusion 
of terms also extends to the principle of necessity.  
 
Much like the term ‘imminence’, the principles of military necessity in IHL and the principle 
of necessity in IHRL are vastly different. Verdirame writes: 
‘Military necessity, one of the cornerstones of the laws of war, has no equivalent in 
human rights law. It reflects the realist and pragmatic assumptions of the laws of wars, 
which, while seeking to minimise the consequences of armed conflict, essentially 
regard war as a social fact and historical reality.’136 
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Far from being a restrictive principle, as some have argued, military necessity provides a 
licensing function in IHL, allowing all actions ‘designed to pursue the ends of war, and 
outlawing only those actions that are delinked from the aims of war and are pursued for 
irrational or emotional reason’, subject to specific rules of IHL.137 The principle remains 
‘incredibly broad’ today, with the ‘truly humane’ aspects of the law stemming from these 
specific IHL prohibitions.138 In other words, ‘the principle [of military necessity] does not say 
that whatever is necessary is permissible, but that everything permissible must be necessary.’139 
The broadly licensing character of military necessity is directly linked to its history, where it 
was first codified in the Lieber Code, written in 1863 by Clausewitz’s fellow Prussian Francis 
(or Franz) Lieber.140 Also known as Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United 
States in the Field or General Order 100, it was issued by President Abraham Lincoln on 24th 
April 1863. In the Code, Lieber wrote: 
‘military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in the necessity 
of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which 
are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.’141  
 
Often called a ‘humanitarian milestone’,142 the Code is more aptly described as ‘tough 
humanitarianism’.143 While considered a blueprint for our modern conception of military 
necessity, the Lieber Code was not particularly constraining. Witt notes that in its most open-
ended provision, the Code authorised any measure necessary to secure the ends of war and 
defend the country, with Lieber writing that ‘to save the country is paramount to all other 
considerations.’144 Lieber was, however, concerned at ‘the prospect of Kriegsraison emerging 
as a rule’, or as a ‘rule-swallowing exception’, and his codification of military necessity was 
directed at its limitation.145  
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The strong influence of Clausewitz that we see in Kriegsraison is also to be found in the Lieber 
Code.146 Lieber himself stated that ‘the more vigorously wars are pursued, the better it is for 
humanity’. It fails to contradict a ‘rather Clausewitzian view of warfare: the shortest wars are 
the best’.147 This, combined with the lack of a restriction on armed forces in measures allowing 
them to secure the ends of war, demonstrates that the Lieber Code does not in fact ‘run radically 
counter to Kriegsraison.’148 Given this Clausewitzian connection in both the doctrines of 
Kriegsraison and military necessity, along with each having been in some way informed by the 
other, it is perhaps not difficult to understand why Colonomos argues that there is no stable 
foundation for the principle of military necessity when one considers the fluid terrain on which 
it has been built.149 Despite this, the wording of military necessity found in the Lieber Code 
remains the ‘closest international law comes to a generally accepted statement of the 
doctrine’.150  
 
Meanwhile, under IHRL, violence should be used only ‘where strictly necessary to protect 
against an imminent threat to life’, with ‘necessity’ here meaning that ‘if the measures taken 
will result in a possible violation of a right, it must be shown that there measures were necessary 
in order to achieve the legitimate objective…’151 The concept of necessity in IHRL is, then, far 
more demanding than the principle of military necessity in IHL, as is apparent in the judgments 
of the ECtHR in United Kingdom v. McCann and Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom. In McCann, 
the ECtHR found that the right to life of three Provisional IRA members killed by British forces 
in Gibraltar had been violated because the use of lethal force should have been avoidable. 
Instead, the Court found that elements of the operation meant that ‘the use of lethal force was 
almost unavoidable’ and were not persuaded that the use of force which killed the three 
individuals in question was ‘no more than absolutely necessary’.152 In Al-Skeini, which 
concerned the killing of Iraqi citizens by British forces in Iraq, the Court again established that 
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the use of force must be ‘no more than absolutely necessary’, and concluded that this provision 
implies ‘that there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals 
have been killed as a result of the use of force by, inter alios, agents of the State.’153 As Ohlin 
and May observe, these cases: 
‘show how powerful the human rights notion of necessity really is. Whether a human 
rights case is explicitly governed by a “least-restrictive-means” test or a test of 
“absolute necessity”, both involve the strictest scrutiny over the government’s 
behaviour. In order to justify its actions, the government needs to show that it had no 
other alternative to secure its legitimate aim; if other, less injurious alternatives existed, 
the government action or policy violates human rights law.’154   
 
The principle of military necessity is decidedly different. It is an unknown entity and a wildly 
alien concept for international human rights law – how can it be acceptable to take human life 
due to an often tenuous belief that it will provide an important military advantage? While in 
human rights law, where the use of force ‘must be absolutely necessary to save the life of 
another’, in international humanitarian law ‘the action need only be necessary for the 
accomplishment of the conflict, which includes defeating the enemy as quickly as possible with 
the fewest risks to one’s own personnel.’155 
 
The United States is undoubtedly applying the jus ad bellum principle of necessity and the IHL 
principle of military necessity to IHRL scenarios, instead of the far more restrictive IHRL 
necessity principle. The U.S. has specifically affirmed that it believes its targeted strikes 
conform to the IHL principles of necessity: 
‘U.S. targeting practices conform to the principle of necessity, which requires that the 
use of military force (including all measures needed to defeat the enemy as quickly and 
efficiently as possible that are not prohibited by the law of armed conflict) be directed 
at accomplishing a legitimate military purpose. Individuals who are part of enemy 
forces are generally legitimate military targets, and the United States may use lethal 
force against enemy forces in the armed conflict in which it is engaged…’156 
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Of course, as has been established above, the application of the IHL principle of military 
necessity to an IHRL scenario is unlawful. As such, a consideration of military necessity, rather 
than IHRL’s necessity, in a region considered to be an ‘area outside of active hostilities’ is 
erroneous. Though the 2013 PPG professes to offer heightened protections to peoples in the 
areas to which it applies, individuals are still targeted according to the IHL criteria of military 
necessity, rather than the concept of necessity in IHRL, which ultimately makes the 2013 PPG 
meaningless. Furthermore, the uncertainty as to the United States criteria for designating a 
region as being an ‘area outside of active hostilities’ is a cause for concern. The apparent ease 
with which such a designation can be removed means the targeting criteria for such a region 
can change in a matter of hours; consider, for example, the decision in March 2017 to declare 
parts of Somalia an ‘area of active hostilities’, in which the PPG will not apply for at least 180 
days.157 Under the guidelines which are now applicable to the relevant areas of Somalia, status-
based targeting is allowed, ‘without any reason to think that the individual target poses a 
particular and specific threat to Americans’.158   
 
The U.S. has repeatedly asserted that all targeted strikes ‘conform to the principle of necessity, 
the requirement that the target have definite military value.’159 However, doubt has been cast 
as to how much military value these targets actually possess. From the beginning of the first 
Obama administration to the present day, there have been a reported 616 drone strikes 
(approximately) in Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia, 74 of which have occurred in the first 74 
days of the Trump administration.160 In total, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism estimates 
that there have been at least 673 strikes in the three countries named above, with a minimum 
of 4,534 killed, included some 1008 civilians.161 If the Bureau’s figures are accepted, at least 
3,526 combatants have been killed in Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia, all of whom have 
allegedly been ‘high-value targets’ representing ‘continuous imminent threats’ – yet the 
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terrorist threat does not seem to have been significantly impacted in any of these countries. In 
Somalia, for example, the removal of the 2013 PPG to Somalia in March 2017 indicates the 
opposite, while the quantitative escalation of strikes in Yemen since January 2017 casts doubt 
on the effectiveness of the targeted killing programme against AQAP to date.162  
 
As Chehtman writes, the available empirical data does not make it clear that military necessity 
supports resorting to drone strikes against extraterritorially based non-state armed groups.163 
According to Chehtman, simple comparisons between the number of drone strikes and the 
number of terrorist attacks over time (or the number of strikes with the number of victims of 
terrorist violence) do not suggest that an increase in drone strikes diminishes the number of 
terrorist attacks, and a similar conclusion follows from studies using regression analysis.164 He 
further notes that in the most positive study, which focuses on drone strikes in Pakistan, the 
effect of drone strikes is found to be ‘rather small’ in reducing the capacity of terrorist groups 
to undertake attacks, and as such drone strikes should not be relied upon as the primary strategy 
for defeating these groups.165 In other studies, drone strikes have been found to have different 
effects on different groups, with strikes on the Taliban in Afghanistan having a negligible 
impact, but strikes on groups in Pakistan ‘triggering more violence instead of reducing it.’166  
 
Yet another issue arises with the application of the IHL principle of military necessity to 
situations that should ostensibly by governed by IHRL. The overbroad interpretation of 
imminence and the privilege it bestows upon the necessity principle at the jus ad bellum level 
has knock-on effects for the principle of proportionality and military necessity at the jus in 
bello level. Amos Guiora (who is in his own words ‘a proponent of targeted killing’) has argued 
that current U.S. policy, with its broad interpretation of imminence, risks privileging jus ad 
bellum proportionality to the extent that jus in bello proportionality is disregarded. He writes: 
‘the increasingly flexible notion of imminence and threat have significant effects on the 
“military advantage gained” (i.e., the value of the target) and therefore on the 
application of the proportionality principle governing the minimization of civilian 
harm. If all threats are so imminent and dangerous as to justify the use of lethal force 
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in self-defense, then the value of taking them out will be great enough to justify 
significant amounts of civilian harm – essentially meaning that broad understandings 
of the first concept of proportionality eliminate the need for the second, equally 
essential, proportionality analysis.’167 
 
If, as is quite likely, many targeted killings (even those which could be deemed permissible) 
are not militarily necessary, then once again, they represent the political and military 
expediency of Kriegsraison. As Ohlin and May have commented, it is wrong to assume that 
military necessity can be employed ‘to explode the restraints of Just War theory and its rules 
of war.’168 The military necessity of the targeted killing programme and the real advantage, if 
any, achieved by it must continue to be interrogated. 
 
Drones: why the weapon matters 
Given Kriegsraison’s tendency to speak in code and hyperbole about probability and risk, and 
its interest in justifying whatever is necessary to reduce losses or even the risk of losses in the 
course of conflict, it would be remiss of this article if it did not briefly interrogate how the U.S. 
portrays drones in its attempts to ‘sell’ the targeted killing programme. In a number of ways, 
the drone represents Kriegsraison’s platonic ideal of a weapon, and indeed drones allow for the 
practical implementation of the Kriegsraison doctrine to an extent not previously possible. 
Indeed, Chamayou describes the drone as ‘the weapon of self-preservation’,169 allowing for the 
projection of power without the projection of vulnerability.170 
 
As stated, drones are the perfect weapon for the Kriegsraison doctrine, allowing as they do for 
the rapid neutralisation of possible threats before that ‘threat’ becomes imminent and giving 
no cause for concern for one’s own troops. It is interesting to note that parallels can again be 
drawn in this arena between WWI-era Germany and the U.S. today, particularly when looking 
at Germany’s employment of the submarine at that time. The submarine was first used between 
1904 and 1905, but it was during the First World War that German statesmen, lawyers and 
military leaders began to push in earnest for the submarine to be accepted by international law. 
There is no doubt that the manner in which Germany used the submarine to destroy merchant 
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ships and the crew on those ships during the war was illegal and broke with tradition. However, 
the fact that the submarine was new meant that it was unmentioned in the Declaration of 
London (DoL) and the Hague Conventions, but, as Hull notes, both the DoL and customary 
law at the time had major implications for submarine warfare.171 Germany, however, argued 
forcefully that the submarine was a new weapon, and that “new means require new forms.”172 
A memorandum by Admiral von Pohl of the Germany Navy to the Chancellor stated that 
‘modern technology’ had handed Germany a weapon that ‘would lead to a complete revolution 
in the conduct of war’.173 Given that ‘new means require new forms’, he argued, one could not 
demand of the U-boat that it surface and announce its presence (to remove crews and 
passengers on neutral merchant ships).174 Germany argued that submarine warfare (and aerial 
attacks, which were also novel at the time) ‘is something completely new and thus outside of 
old international law’.175 It also stated that belligerents had the right to use the submarine 
weapon and wanted the rest of the international community to recognise this right, too, arguing 
that ‘only such firmness…can convince [other nations] of the existing, perfect right to use this 
form of war conduct…’.176 Hull writes that the navy was ‘determined to get the submarine and 
what they took to be its essential manner of warfare recognized by the world as legal, with one 
Admiral confiding to his diary in September 1916 that it was ‘essential to work with all political 
means on the USA so that it recognizes the justice and necessity of our unrestricted submarine 
policy.’177 Further legal opinions offered by the navy noted the submarine’s unique 
characteristics of surprise underwater attack, and argued that, this being the submarine’s 
‘essence’, actions such as stopping, searching ships papers, and saving the crew could not be 
required of submarines – the element of surprise at its core making the weapon exceptional. 
Vice Admiral Reinhard Scheer wrote: 
‘The new weapon needs a new law. That is a natural development of law, as it is 
recognized in every area of human progress. It is not illegal. But the new law naturally 
produces resistance fed by contrary interests, and overcoming that requires work and 
energy. It is said that “international law can only be made by those with power.” We 
have the power, if we defeat England…’178  
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Much like drone use today, ‘the new weapon, law, and world power were thus inextricably tied 
together.’179 Germany’s submarine use in World War I was echoed on both sides during World 
War II, and represented what Hull terms as ‘weapons positivism’, where ‘technological 
progress completely undermined and displaced written law. The engineer replaced the 
legislator.’180 Hull connects this to the legal positivism dominant in Bismarckian Germany, 
where Carl Lueder (who has already been discussed as the principle proponent of 
Kriegsraison), had written that ‘the formation of the law of war…flows from the nature of war’ 
and that ‘all warlike measures of violence which are required by the goal of war, must be used 
unlimitedly and cannot be restricted by a legal commandment.’181 As such, ‘where Lueder had 
derived the law (of military necessity) from the alleged nature of war, the Wilhelminians 
derived it from the nature of weapons.’182  
 
The United States’ drone use, and arguments around drones’ legality and the U.S. right to use 
them, run extremely close to German arguments around the submarine. With the drone, not 
only has the U.S. introduced a new weapon with which to fight war in a new way, it has 
attempted to create entirely new legal standards to fit the use of this weapon. Like the 
submarine and World War I, drones were already in existence and in use for surveillance and 
reconnaissance purposes prior to the first U.S. drone strike of the targeted killing programme 
in 2002. It was the U.S., however, who first armed a Predator drone with a hellfire missile in 
2001.183 With the advent of the ‘War on Terror’, the U.S. realised the revolutionary potential 
of the drone and began to utilise it in an unprecedented manner. The creation and expansion of 
the targeted killing programme has seen efforts by the U.S. to normalise the weapon, while 
refusing to support a UNHRC resolution on the use of armed drones.184 Drones are considered 
as battlefield weapons, used in the same way as rocket launchers and bomber aircraft, and it is 
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argued that U.S. drone use ‘is no different than our launch of these other launch vehicles’.185 It 
is telling that while some have argued that armed drones are neither revolutionary nor 
transformative,186 drones have nonetheless been described as being ‘the only game in town’;187 
‘a major step forward’ in humanitarian technology and as having ‘exceptional proficiency, 
precision.’…188  
 
The legality of armed drones under international law is generally uncontested. Yet, despite 
their ostensible legality, there remains a lack of consensus on how the various rules of 
international law that regulate the use of lethal force should be applied to drones.189  The U.S., 
much like Germany in WWI, has taken advantage of silences in the law to encourage the tacit 
acceptance of the weapon, if not the way in which it is being used, by the international 
community. It has done so primarily through its presentation of drones as exceptional weapons, 
imbued with both the characteristics of humanity and precision, providing a perfect vehicle for 
Kriegsraison’s manner of ‘speaking in code’ and hyperbole about probability and risk. For 
targeted killing, the concepts of precision, accuracy and humanity work in concert to reify the 
idea of the armed drone as an ‘exceptional’ weapon. If the ‘war on terror’ is exceptional in its 
nature, then an exceptional weapon or weapons system should - or indeed must - be used to 
fight it. Descriptions of armed drones regularly include the word ‘exceptional’, for example: 
‘exceptional proficiency’;190 ‘exceptional ability to accurately identify and attack targets’;191 
‘exceptionally precise, exceptionally surgical and exceptionally targeted’.192 In a discussion on 
drones and the FATA province of Pakistan, Shah notes that the positing of drones as 
‘exceptional technology’ and of FATA as ‘exceptional territory’ has ‘allowed the 
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uncomfortable marriage of drones with the region of FATA’.193 This idea of ‘exception’ 
permeates almost every facet of the targeted killing programme and the wider ‘war on terror’. 
The conflict is said to be exceptional in its very nature and the weapons used are exceptional 
in their technical abilities. The civilians killed are killed in ‘tragic’ incidents, representing 
exceptions to the norm, and despite the sheer number of targeted killings carried out, each 
individual targeted is deemed to present an exceptional threat. Yet the ‘exceptional’ practice 
of targeted killing is now routine, and firmly embedded in U.S. military practice. 
The majority of scholarship and commentary on the subject accepts that in an armed conflict 
scenario, drones are legal and subject only to the strictures of IHL. Whether drones can comply 
with IHRL is another matter. While they are not illegal per se under IHRL, the instances in 
which it would be lawful to use a drone in a non-conflict situation to which IHRL applies will 
be extremely rare, given that using a drone-fired missile will likely instantly kill both the target 
and any other individual in his or her vicinity. Drones also present legal challenges of another 
kind – they necessitate a rethinking of our conceptions of ‘power’ and ‘control’ regarding 
jurisdiction in international human rights law, and raise the very real possibility that their use 
relaxes the standards for resort to force in the jus ad bellum, making targeted killing across 
borders easier than in the past, potentially undermining the role of State sovereignty, and 
thereby the international security system.194 There are also concerns that as drones allow for 
the targeting of individuals without any risk to a State’s forces, ‘policy makers and 
commanders will be tempted to interpret the legal limitations on who can be killed, and under 
what circumstances, too expansively.’195 Furthermore, Chehtman argues that there is another 
facet to the effect of drones on jus ad bellum proportionality. It is unlikely, he says, that drones 
can comply with the principle of proportionality, because their perceived advantages in 
discrimination are counteracted by the lesser chances of success in achieving the just cause of 
war.196 Drones may make resort to force easier, but this force is less likely to succeed in 
attaining the desired goal.  
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Although some moves were made toward transparency in the final year of the Obama 
administration, the targeted killing programme, as is to be expected, remains secretive and 
opaque. As such, a lack of information means that creating a definitive stance on the legality 
or otherwise of individual strikes can be difficult. However, it is still possible to holistically 
assess the legal arguments and practice of the U.S. At the very least, the United States is being 
disingenuous in its classification of conflicts, and deliberately dishonest in its application and 
interpretation of imminence and necessity at the jus ad bellum level. The United States 
continues to portray a flagrant disregard for widely accepted norms and rules, even while it 
pays lip-service to them. Worryingly, it also appears to be operating under the mistaken belief 
that necessity and military necessity can operate as the sole justifications for military action. 
The United States has never expressly invoked Kriegsraison, but like WWI-era Germany it 
holds opinio juris to be a function of state wartime practice, as is evidenced by its consistent 
attempts to have the international community accept a non-existent right of preventive self-
defence, an overbroad and uniquely flexible conception of ‘imminence’, and the creation of 
regions to which IHL applies, despite these regions being ‘outside areas of active hostilities’. 
With this fallacious reasoning, the U.S. ushers in the return of Kriegsraison.  
 
We should remain wary of arguments that ‘new means require new forms’, particularly when 
these ‘new’ forms represent a return to a much-discredited and disgraced doctrine of 
international law.197 The United States has consistently argued that the current international 
law regime requires modification in order to address the threats and challenges faced today. 
This is not the case. The regimes of international humanitarian law and international human 
rights law as they currently exist are more than capable of addressing the current terrorist 
challenges faced by States.198 Those who argue against their applicability, or who assert that 
neither body can adequately engage with the issues of drone strikes and transnational terror do 
so in order to better justify their own contempt for these rules. Heyns et al, in arguing that 
‘drones should follow the law, rather than the other way around’, write: 
 
‘The legal framework for maintaining international peace and the protection of the right 
to life is a coherent and well-established system, reflecting norms that have been 
developed over the centuries and have withstood the test of time. Even though drones 
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are not illegal weapons, they can easily be abused. The central norms of international 
law need not and should not be abandoned to meet challenges posed by terrorism and 
‘new’ forms of conflict. On the contrary, the fact that drones make targeted killing so 
much easier should serve as a prompt to ensure a diligent application of these standards, 
especially in view of the likely expansion in the number of States with access to this 
technology in the future.’199  
 
In noting that ‘the drone campaign is saturated with the language of law’, Jaffer remarks that 
‘if this is law, it is law without limits – law without constraint.’200 And what is this a symbol 
of, other than Kriegsraison? The hyperbole, and the political and military expedience of 
Kriegsraison, are demonstrated in the actions and words of the U.S. in relation to its position 
on the extraterritoriality of international human rights law. The U.S. continues to actively resist 
the extraterritorial applicability of IHRL for reasons both policy and law-driven. It is far easier 
to describe the deaths of civilians in a drone strike as an ‘unfortunate’ or ‘tragic’ accident, or 
as collateral damage, when that strike takes place in the context of an armed conflict. Such 
arguments and positions are much less convincing, and harder to sustain, when, away from the 
battlefield or ‘hot spot’ of fighting, these individuals are imbued again with their right to life 
and those other rights which accompany it, and the decision to deprive them of their enjoyment 
of these rights must be convincingly explained and justified.  
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